Provide an argument for the claim that (some) mental states are not Essay - 1

Provide an purpose for the claim that ( nearly) rational states argon not wish well to any ace state - Essay ExampleFurthermore, it will discuss the relevant concepts in philosophical system that will either affirm or negate these suppositions. In order to make this possible, the monist and dualist concepts are likewise discussed. Some mental states (beliefs) are not identical to any brain state The first pedigree being focused in this paper is the difference between mental and brain states. As mentioned earlier, these twain are different concepts. Many people are confused and often use these two interchangeably. The mental state has a deeper context compared to that of the brain state. This is so because it refers to the state of a persons thoughts regarding distract or happiness, what a person counts in, and also ideas and aspirations. On the other hand, the brain state refers to the literal hold back of the nervous system like a brain activity. According to Adam Senne t (chap. 5), some mental states, like beliefs, are not identical or correspondent to any brain state. This is because beliefs are not take apart of any physiological activities of the body particularly inside the brain. the famous philosopher Descartes (qtd. in Carruthers 7) postulated that the mind is not spatial but has the ability to think, while the body is spatial but is unable to think hence, the body is only if capable of biological and physiological activities. ... nd Y are actually similar, then they should excite the very uniform attributes, which is not true in the concept of the mind (beliefs) and the body (brain state). Hence, if X and Y have different attributes, they can never be considered as identical. The differences in the mental and brain states include the argument of certainty (Wright). The mind can be certain about pain or desires but the brain cannot be certain about anything because it lacks a logical attribute. There is a great disparity between the m ental state and the brain state as clearly stated by this Law. There are, however, some arguments by other philosophers like Carruthers that the Leibniz Law does not apply to mental states including beliefs, pains, and desires. He argues that if X and Y are not very similar meats, then X and Y must have the same intrinsic attributes or properties (Carruthers 8). He believes that the mental state does not have a property of belief. Thus, he sticks to his argument that the two substances are very similar because they are one (Wright). The Monist Concept This concept does not hold the proposition that there are two kinds of substances. It holds that there is only one kind of substance and that the brain and the mind are just the same. There are, however, two separate views about this one substance. These are materialism and idealism (Carruthers 6). Materialism is an idea that all that exists are material or physical, while idealism is an idea which states that all that exists are ult imately mental. These are the two ideas in the Monist concept and there are philosophers who believe on either one or another but not both. The materialist does not believe that there is such a thing as the mental state and so they are similar or identical to absolutely nothing, because